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Abstract. In this article I wish to show how care ethics puts forward a fundamental critique on the ideal of
independency in human life without thereby discounting autonomy as a moral value altogether. In care ethics, a
relational account of autonomy is developed instead. Because care ethics is sometimes criticized in the literature
as hopelessly vague and ambiguous, I shall begin by elaborating on how care ethics and its place in ethical theory
can be understood. I shall stipulate a deﬁnition of care ethics as a moral perspective or orientation from which
ethical theorizing can take place. This will mean that care ethics is more a stance from which we can theorize
ethically, than ready-made theory in itself. In conceiving care ethics in this way, it becomes possible to make
clear that, for instance, a moral concept of autonomy is not abandoned, but instead is given a particular place and
interpretation. In the ﬁnal part of this article I will show how ’relational autonomy’can be applied fruitfully in the
practice of psychiatric care.
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Introduction
Care ethics is sometimes seen as an ethical orientation
which has no place for a concept such as autonomy. In
a care perspective, understood as a relational perspec-
tive, the notion of individual autonomy is criticized
as fundamentally individualistic. In this article I wish
to show how care ethics puts forward a fundamental
critique on the ideal of independency in human life
without thereby discounting autonomy as a moral
value altogether. In care ethics, a relational account of
autonomy is developed instead.
Because care ethics is sometimes criticized in the
literature as hopelessly vague and ambiguous, I shall
start by elaborating on how care ethics and its place
in ethical theory can be understood. I shall stipu-
late a deﬁnition of care ethics as a moral perspective
or orientation from which ethical theorizing can take
place. This will mean that care ethics is more a stance
from which we can theorize ethically than a ready-
made theory in itself. In conceiving care ethics in
this way, it becomes possible to make clear that, for
instance, a moral concept of autonomy is not aban-
doned, but instead is given a particular place and
interpretation. After having explored the meaning of
this concept of ‘relational autonomy’, I shall try to
show brieﬂy in the last paragraph the practical impli-
cations of using this notion of ‘relational autonomy’ in
the context of social psychiatric care.
What is care ethics anyway?
Since Carol Gilligan’s publication In a different voice
(1982) , a vast amount of literature on care ethics has
been developed. Part of this literature gives expres-
sion to the idea of care ethics as the articulation of
important moral experiences which has been silenced
in the history of philosophy and ethics. But there are
others who view care ethics as an object of suspicion.
They consider care ethics as ‘nothing new’, superﬂu-
ous and dangerous. The discussion between these two
parties is even made more difﬁcult by the fact that
there is a lot of confusionabout what care ethics is and
what contributions it has to make to the ﬁeld of ethics
and moral theory. At the outset I want to dismiss two
misunderstandings about care ethics. A ﬁrst misunder-
standing is the idea that care ethics is a form of applied
ethics, more speciﬁcally, as a type of ethics relevant
to healthcare decision making. It thereby distinguishes
itself from other forms of bioethics in its emphasis
on concepts of care and caring. In this respect, care
ethics is often indistinguishablefrom so-callednursing
ethics. Now, although it is certainly true that nursing290 MARIAN A. VERKERK
ethics does make use of insights from care ethics, the
two cannot be equated. The claims it makes are much
more ambitious than simply being a form of applied
ethics.
Another misunderstanding about care ethics is the
idea that it provides a self-contained ethic adequate
to some sphere of moral life. For instance, an ethics
of friendship or an ethics of personal relationships
are put forward as candidates for such an ethics of
care. This interpretation is at home with all those
other approaches in which an ethics of care is given
a place next to the so-called ethics of justice in the
moral scheme. Some deny the moral importance of a
care ethics: it is not a moral perspective, but solely a
personal one. Others plead for the adding of elements
of care ethics to an ethics of justice in order to develop
a more balanced ethics (Held, 1993; Ruddick, 1989).
There are also those who regard perspectives as suit-
able to different moral contexts. Care should belong
to the more personal sphere, in which agent-relative
reasoning is appropriate and justice should be more at
home in the large-scale and institutional contexts, in
which agent-neutral reasons are the most appropriate
ones. Finally, there are theorists, for instance Joan
Tronto in her book Moral Boundaries (1993), who
stress the idea that the split care and justice, or the
moral boundary between a more abstract moral point
of view of justice and the more engaged and partic-
ularistic moral point of view of care, should itself
be questioned. As Tronto says, we cannot perceive
care as a central aspect of human life as long as we
leave current moral boundaries in place. Although the
discussion about the proper place of an ethics of care
in the ethical discourse still goes on and is not yet
settled, I think that an ethics of care is more ambitious
in its claims than to be solely an ethics of personal
relationships.
Butif careethicsisnotaformofappliedethics, and
if it cannot be considered as an ethics of personal rela-
tionships, what is it then? We can pose this question
in even more annoying terms: Is care ethics, after all,
really an ethics?1 Perhaps it can be best presented as
a moral perspective or orientation than as a full-blown
ethical theory. For instance, in a recent article in the
Journal of Philosophy and Medicine (1998), Margaret
Olivia Little understands care ethics ﬁrst and foremost
as an orientation or perspective to the moral world.
The care perspective is deﬁned in term of emphases of
concern and discernment (to notice and worry more,
say, about the dangers of abandonment rather than
the dangers of interference), habits and proclivities of
interpretation (the proclivity, say, to read ‘the’ moral
question presented by a situation in terms of respon-
sibilities rather than rights) and selectivity of skills (to
have developed, say, an attunement to difference than
an ease of abstraction). Little stresses the idea that
care ethics is more a stance from which to theorize,
rather thana ready-madetheoryin itself. Althoughthis
will sound to some as too modest a claim on behalf
of care ethics, I think that Little makes an important
point here. For instance, care ethics has been criticized
because its claims are either too broad or too narrow.
In claiming that we should care for each other, it urges
either expansive obligations to the world at large or
it remains too parochial in its responsibilities. But as
Little points out, ‘the truth is that the care orienta-
tion in and of itself does not claim either.’ Care as
an orientation or as a perspective is directed at living
good in concrete relationships with others, responding
to their needs and building up a joint life. It thereby
underscores the importance of connection and attach-
ment. What we need to do is to examine the results
of theorizing from the lens of this care orientation
and see what emerges about the claims of ‘strangers’
and of ‘intimates’ (Little, 1998, p. 204). And so it
remains to be seen what kind of proposals care ethics
theoreticallyleadsusto. Somecareethicistshavepoin-
ted to the importance of trust and self-trust in moral
life (Baier, 1995; Govier, 1992). Loyalty, friendship
and caring as important moral concepts seem to be
neglected or marginalized in the ethical discourses so
far. Other concepts, such as respect, receive a different
meaning in the care perspective. For instance, Robin
Dillon has developed a care perspective on the notion
of respect, in which respecting a person involves valu-
ingandtreatinghernotasacaseofgenericpersonhood
but as the whole and concretely particular person she
is (Dillon, 1992). Interestingly enough, she thereby
sees the core element of care as a form of attention
and moral appreciation of individual persons. “The
term ‘care’ denotes here an epistemic attitude , under-
stood as a moral ideal of attention: a commitment
to attend, with intensely focused perception to all
aspects of the irreducible particularity of individual
human persons in their concrete contexts” (Dillon,
1992, p. 128). In that way, care ethics promotes
a particularistic moral epistemology in which atten-
tion, contextual and narrative appreciation, and
communication are considered as elements of moral
deliberation.
In this article I want to concentrate on what care
ethics as a moral orientation implies for the concept
of autonomy. With the introduction of a relational
account of moral agency and the idea of interdepend-
ency as characteristic of human existence, care ethics
introduces a concept of autonomy which has so far
been marginalized in moral theory.THE CARE PERSPECTIVE AND AUTONOMY 291
A care critique on autonomy
Some have misunderstood the care perspective as if it
would have no place for a concept of autonomy. Now
it is certainly true that there is some tension between
care and autonomy. For instance, traditional practices
of care in which care was seen as solely a ‘women’s
practice’ have undermined the personal autonomy of
women themselves. For a long time women have been
socialised to curb their ambitions and to identify them-
selves with the goals of others to the neglect of their
own. Connectingthis with the fact that care in terms of
caring work is very much socially devalued in society,
only worsens women’s situation. It is because of these
reasons that Joan Tronto argues that an ethics of care
remains incomplete without a political theory of care.
That is, care is only viable as an ideal in the context
of liberal, pluralistic and democratic institutions. For
reasons of space I shall not elaborate further on the
political implications of an ethics of care.
Whereas care ethics has been criticized for not
sufﬁciently safeguarding the personal autonomy of
carers, care ethics itself contains a fundamental
critique on autonomy. This care critique on autonomy
is focused on the idea of a self as free and independ-
ent. In order to understand this critique on autonomy
properly, a distinction must be made between an ideal
of autonomy in terms of self-sufﬁciency and inde-
pendency on the one hand, and autonomy in terms
of the moral capacity to make one’s own choices in
life on the other hand. It is precisely this ideal of
self-sufﬁciency that is ﬁercely criticized by care ethi-
cist’s. The ideal of self-sufﬁciency rests on the idea
that a good life is a life in which we do not need
the help or support from anyone in meeting our needs
and carrying out our life plan. This idea of the self as
‘disembedded and disembodied’ has played a promin-
ent role in moral and political theory. Not only care
ethics, but also communitarian perspectives have criti-
cised this conception of the self and have criticised it
as abstract, empty and unrealizable. But care ethicists
differ from these other criticisms in the way that care
ethics points to the effects which the dominance of
independence as an ideal has for the moral status of
persons. In feminist literature, but also in the literature
on disability, it is stressed that the value of inde-
pendence has adverse consequences for women and
disabled persons. Dependence on the help of others is
often humiliating in a society which prizes indepen-
dence. Susan Wendell therefore pleads for the ideal
of interdependence (Wendell, 1996). She states that
we should question our cultural obsession with inde-
pendence and replace it with a model of reciprocity.
If the disabled are to be fully integrated into society
without symbolizing failure, then we have to change
social values to recognize the value of depending on
others and being depended upon.
To understandthe value of care itself, it is therefore
necessarythatwerethink thehumancondition asinter-
dependent.It is also becauseof this that Tronto deﬁnes
care as a species activity and as an ongoing practice
that is aimed at maintaining, continuing and repairing
our world.
In starting from the assumption of human inter-
dependency, care ethics points our attention to other
moral issues and questions. For instance, it is more
concerned about the dangers of abandonment than
the dangers of interference. It sees moral questions
more in terms of responsibilities than of rights. This
is not to say that care ethics is simply not interested
in rights, equality or autonomy, but it does try to
develop alternative conceptions of these terms. The
critique of autonomy in terms of self-sufﬁciency still
leaves room for an idea of autonomy as the moral
capacity to make one’s own choices in life, sustained
by others. More precisely, care ethics leaves room
for a conception of autonomy which is not deﬁned in
opposition to relations of dependence and connection.
Diana Meyers, for instance, suggests that we should
think about autonomy as a competency which in its
turn is deﬁned as a repertory of co-ordinated skills that
enables a person to perform a speciﬁed task (Meyers,
1987). Theseskills are usedin concertin order to carry
out a procedure which allows one to monitor one’s
conduct and determine whether or not it is in accord-
ance with one’s true self. An autonomous agent asks
questions such as ‘Can I take responsibility for this or
that action while retaining my self-respect?’ or ‘Could
I bear to be the sort of person who can do that?’ The
true self that is consulted in this process is not to be
understood as a true self in ontological terms, as a self
that can be discovered by stripping back the layers of
socialisation. Instead, the true self is dynamic, it is – as
Meyers puts it – an evolving collocation of traits that
emerges through the use of autonomous competency
(Meyers, 1987, p. 76). The true self is an ‘encumbered
self’, a self that is always already embedded in rela-
tionships with ﬂesh and blood, others and is partly
constituted by these relationships. By developing a
relational concept of moral agency, care ethicist’s lay
stress on the necessity of having relationships in order
to see oneself as autonomous.
So far, the care critique of autonomy can be sum-
marized as follows. In the ﬁrst place, it questions
the idea of self-sufﬁciency and independence as the
main value for human living. It points to the fact
that in emphasizing this ideal of independency other
values such as trust, caring and responsibility are
neglected in the moral discourse. Secondly, autonomy
as a moral competency is not to be seen in isola-292 MARIAN A. VERKERK
tion from other persons and relationships. Instead, it
stresses that autonomy as a moral capacity can only be
developedinrelationtoothers.It isimportanttounder-
score the insight that this critique of autonomy does
not imply a rejection of the notion of autonomy alto-
gether.Thecareperspectiveleavesroomforautonomy,
as an idea of moral competency, which in turn is
reconceptualized as deﬁned to relationships. In their
book Relational Autonomy – Feminist Perspectives
on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self (2000),
Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar divide rela-
tional conceptions of autonomy into constitutively
relational conceptions and causally relational concep-
tions (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000, p. 22). Those
approaches focusing on the social constitution of the
agent or the social nature of the capacity of autonomy
itself, are constitutive conceptions, whereas those
focusing on the ways in which socialization and social
relationships impede or enhance autonomy are causal
conceptions. The constitutive approach sees the self
as relational in the sense that one of the fundamental
ways a person conceives of himself and thinks about
the world around him is in terms of the relationships
in which he is involved (Keller, 1997). The causal
approach underwrites the view that the capacity for
autonomy is the product of the appropriate kind of
socialtrainingandofsocialandhistoricalcontexts.For
instance, Diana Meyers (1987) analyses in her work
the ways in which oppressive social environments can
impair agents’ autonomy on a causal level (Mackenzie
and Stoljar, 2000, p. 22). In a concept of relational
autonomy both dimensions should play a role. In
the following I shall concentrate on the meaning of
relational autonomy as moral competency and try to
show how relationships – constitutively and causally
– can be of importance in developing autonomy. I
shall elaborate on the notion of relational autonomy
by making use of the discussion on introducing more-
or-less interfering interventions in social psychiatric
care.
Compassionate interference and attaining
autonomy
I think that the alternative conception of autonomy,
known as ‘relational autonomy’, can have merit in the
discussion of some moral issues that we face today. I
wish to show this by brieﬂy examining one example.
In the Netherlands, there is a growing debate over
involuntarly institutionalisation and other compuls-
ory treatment of mental patients. In 1994, a law on
Involuntary Admittance to Psychiatric Hospitals (Wet
Bopz) was passed. This law determines the legal
position of the psychiatric patient who face possible
coercive institutionalisation. In contrast to the past,
coercive institutionalisation and compulsory treatment
are no longer justiﬁed for paternalistic reasons. The
right of self-determination overrules considerations of
protecting the well-being of patients. Only in cases
of severe risk and danger to society and patient are
coercive interventions legally and morally justiﬁed.
Particularly in the context of psychiatric health care,
however,the dominance of respecting the right of self-
determination is being questioned. In fact, in 1997
the Dutch government asked the National Council
of Care as to advice, whether coercive interventions
for reasons of protecting the well-being of patients
could not be justiﬁed under certain circumstances.
By posing this question, the government started a
re-evaluation of the Wet Bopz. This re-evaluation
is the more pressing if we consider certain recent
developments in health-care policies. In the Nether-
lands, a process of de-institutionalisation has been
taking place. More and more patients with chronic
diseases remain outside the institutionalised forms of
care. This means that care is becoming more socially
integrated and the patient more emancipated. This
process of de-institutionalisation has as its side-effect
that patients sometimes do not receive the care they
need. This especially applies to those patients who
havedevelopeda deep distrust towards the care system
and because of that, avoid care.
In reaction to this situation, practitioners in social
psychiatric care have pleaded for the introduction of
what they call ‘compassionate interference’ in caring
relationships. By making this particular plea, practi-
tioners are stressing the need for a different outlook
on what good care should mean. Instead of taking
an attitude of non-intereference and thereby respect-
ing the autonomy of the patient, there was a plea
for an active and committed role for the professional
care taker. The carer should not stand aside. On the
contrary, he should follow the patients, look him up,
and direct him when necessary. This professional atti-
tude aroused a lot of hostile reactions of which the
most often heard was that of ‘modern paternalism’.
‘Compassionate interference’ does not appear to be
the politically correct answer in caring relationships
today. Respect for autonomy even seems to exclude
a professional attitude of attentiveness and commit-
ment. However, the practitioners have pointed out that
the current concept of care leaves us with a para-
dox. Current practices of care conceive patients as
individuals who have a strong interest in freedom
and non-interference, whereas at the same time a
lot of patients have a desperate need for ﬂourishing
and viable relationships. In fact, part of their prob-
lem is that they cannot relate very well with other
people.THE CARE PERSPECTIVE AND AUTONOMY 293
I think that a care perspective can offer us
arguments for ‘compassionate interference’ without
thereby being trapped in a balancing strategy between
a respect for self-determination and paternalism. In
the ﬁrst place, I have described the care perspective
as a perspective in which there is more concern about
the dangers of abandonment than about the dangers of
interference. This should direct our attention to how
people can relate to each other, rather than how they
can be left free. The critique of the practitioners can
be understood as a critique of a care vision in which
the ideal of autonomy as self-sufﬁciency and inde-
pendency is dominant. Instead they plead for a care
perspectivein which having relationships and commit-
ment is important. In this they also stress the idea of
conceiving the person as having a relational identity.
Secondly, the moral question in a care perspective is
presented in terms of responsibilities rather than of
rights. The idea of a good care relationship is not
captured in terms of a right for non-interference on
the part of the one being cared for and a duty not to
interfere on the part of the carer. Instead, the relation-
ship is seen as a relationship in which responsibilities
towardseachotherareset. Inthatperspective,compas-
sionate interference as a treatment can be conceivedas
a form of a caring relationship in which the responsi-
bilities of the carer as well as of the care-receiver are
put at the forefront. The carer has a responsibility to
be attentive to the needs of the care-receiver whereas
the care-receiver is asked to be responsive to the care
given. In this perspective on care, the emphasis is on
care as a process. Finally, in developing a more rela-
tional model of autonomy, interventions in care can be
shown to be in the interest of patients, that is, they
can be seen as interventions for attaining autonomy,
instead of threatening autonomy. In a conception of
relational autonomy socialization, social relationships
can impede as well as improve autonomy as a moral
competency. In particular, patients in social psychi-
atric care experience impediments in their attaining
autonomy. For instance, they sometimes experience
a low level of self-respect and self-esteem which are
themselvesthe resultof certaintypes ofoppressiveand
damaging social experiences. A reduced self-respect
underminesautonomybyunderminingtheindividual’s
sense of himself as capable of making judgments.
Moreover, as the messages of reduced self-respect
are internalized, these impediments are not easily
removed. Instead, those patients should be helped in
caring and committed relationshipsto regain their self-
esteem. ‘Compassionate interference’ is described by
patients themselves as ‘committed care’, ‘as being
there’, as ‘standing next to me’. It is seen as a form
of care in which the carer sees the patient as someone
of importance, as someone who is worthwhile stand-
ing next to. In this respect compassionate interference
can be seen as a form of care in which the patient has
anopportunityto becomeautonomous.Althoughmore
needs to be said in order to give a concrete moral justi-
ﬁcation for compassionateinterference, I think that the
above considerations show that a care perspective can
handle questions of compassionate interference and
other so-called compulsory treatments more fruitfully
(see also Verkerk, 1999).
Conclusion
In this article I have tried to make clear how a notion
of individual autonomy can have a place in care
ethics. From a care perspective, autonomy is criti-
cized on two grounds: First, the ideal of autonomy
in terms of independence and self-sufﬁciency is criti-
cized. Instead an idea of interdependency, descrip-
tively and prescriptively, is emphasized. Secondly,
autonomy as moral competency should get rid of its
individualistic connotations. Instead a notion of rela-
tional agency should be introduced as underlying the
concept of autonomy. By way of an example I have
tried to show how a care perspective on autonomy can
have merit for actual discussions in social psychiatric
care.
Note
1. In a recent article in the Journal of Medicine and Philo-
sophy (1998), Robert Veatch asks himself this very same
question: What kind of ethical theory is care ethics? For
Veatch the question of what kind of ethical theory care
ethics is, remains obsolete.
References
Baier, A.: 1995, Moral Prejudices. Cambridge MS: Harvard
University Press.
Dillon, R.: 1992, ‘Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integra-
tion’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22, 105–132.
Gilligan, G.: 1982, In a Different Voice. Cambridge MS:
Harvard University Press.
Govier, T.: 1992, ‘Self-Trust, Autonomy and Self-Esteem’,
Hypatia 8 (1), 99–120.
Held, V.: 1993, Feminist Morality. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Keller, J.: 1997, ‘Autonomy, Relationality and Feminist Ethics’,
Hypatia 12 (2), 152–164.
Little, M.:1998, ‘Care: From Theory to Orientation and Back’,
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 23 (2), 190–209.
Mackenzie, C. and N. Stoljar (eds.): 2000, Relational
Autonomy. Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and
the Social Self. New York: Oxford University Press.294 MARIAN A. VERKERK
Meyers, D.: 1987, Self, Society and Personal Choice.N e w
York: Columbia University Press.
Ruddick, S.: 1989, Maternal Thinking. New York: Ballantine
Books.
Tronto, J.: 1993, Moral Boundaries. New York: Routledge.
Veatch, R.: 1998, ‘The Place of Care in Ethical Theory’,
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 23 (2), 210–224.
Verkerk, M.: 1999, ‘A Care Perspective on Coercion and
Autonomy’, Bioethics 13 (3/4), 358–369.
Walker, M.U.: 1998, Moral Understandings. New York: Rout-
ledge.
Wendell, S.: 1996, The Rejected Body. New York: Routledge.